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Abstract
We isolate strategic and non-strategic motivations of sanctioning in a repeated public
goods game. In two experimental treatments, subjects play the public goods game with
the possibility to sanction others. In the STANDARD sanctions treatment, each subject
learns about the sanctions received in the same round as they were assigned, but in
the SECRET sanctions treatment, sanctions are announced only after the experiment is
nished, removing in this way all strategic reasons to punish. We nd that sanctioning
is similar in both treatments, giving support for nonstrategic explanations of sanctions
(altruistic punishment). Interestingly, contributions to the public good in both treatments
with sanctioning are higher than when the public goods game is played without any
sanctioning, irrespective of announcing the sanctions to their receivers during the play of
the game, or only after the game is nished. The mere knowledge that sanctions might
be assigned increases cooperation: subjects correctly expect that nonstrategic sanctioning
takes place against freeriders.
JEL Classication: C72, C92, D74.
Key words: altruistic punishment, nonstrategic sanctions, strategic sanctions, public
goods, economic experiment.
1 Introduction
The e¢ cacy of sanctioning in sustaining cooperation is well-documented in the exper-
imental literature (Ostrom et al. 1992, Fehr and Gächter 2000, Egas and Riedl 2005,
Masclet et al., 2003, Carpenter 2007, van Soest and Vyrastekova 2006). In various social
dilemmas (public goods or common pool resource games) and parametrization thereof,
experimental subjects are willing to incur costs in order to decrease payo¤ of others. Im-
portantly, these payo¤ sanctions a¤ect behavior in the social dilemmas and give rise to
stable, or even over time increasing, cooperation.
Due to the impact of sanctions on behavior, we strive to understand the mechanisms
that underlie sanctioning (see also Falk et al., 2005). Negative emotions held towards
freeriders are hypothesized to be the proximate mechanism that sustains this outwardly
costly behavior (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Hence, the decision to assign a sanction is
suggested to be nonstrategic. Not a result of a strategic and payo¤-maximizing choice, it
is commonly referred to in the literature as altruistic punishment. Indeed, Hopfensitz and
Reuben (2005) provide evidence that self-reported emotions of anger are related to the
punishment decisions. Also, there is evidence on the neurological processes underlying
sanctioning. Quervain et al. (2004) measure brain activation patterns and relate sanc-
tioning to the anticipated gratication. This evidence on pleasurable emotions related to
sanctioning explains why (some) subjects are willing to incur its material costs. In view
of this evidence, there is little doubt that altruistic punishment does exist.
Nevertheless, we should be aware that sanctioning could also be motivated by strategic
considerations. Here we have in mind a rational, payo¤-maximization-guided decision to
assign a sanction for freeriding in a repeated game in order to manipulate the beliefs of oth-
ers about the future consequences of free-riding.1 Under the prevailing uncertainty about
the preferences of other players, including the uncertainty about the presence of individ-
uals willing to sanction for nonstrategic reasons, a rational, money-maximizing subject
might nd it protable to impose sanctions early in the game in order to generate the ex-
pectation that altruistic punishers are present in the interaction, and that free-riding will
1Kreps et al. (1982) provide solution to rational cooperation in a nitely repeated prisoners dilemma
game in this spirit.
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be sanctioned. The short-run costs incurred in this way might be compensated by long-
run increase of cooperation by players trying to avoid sanctioning. Note that the observed
sanctioning in repeated social dilemma games, which typically takes place in the initial
periods of interaction, upon which the cooperation levels increase/sanctioning decreases,
would be in line with non-strategic as well as strategic explanations of sanctioning. The
nonstrategic explanations are supported by the fact that sanctions are found even in true
one-shot interactions (Walker and Halloran, 2004) or in the last round of interactions (see
the papers quoted above). At the same time, the sensitivity of the sanctioning decision to
the cost/benet parametrization of the sanctioning technology (Anderson and Putterman
2006, Carpenter 2007, Egas and Riedl 2005, Nikiforakis and Normann, forthcoming) is
reminiscent of strategic motives in the choice to sanction.
Understanding the origins of sanctioning motivations is urgently relevant for the de-
sign of institutions which rely heavily on peer sanctioning, and where the working of
centralized enforcement is precluded (e.g. micronance, see Besley and Coate, 1995). If
sanctions are prevailing strategic, then aspects that promote strategic reasoning should
be stimulated (e.g. small groups, long-run interaction, information on the consequences of
free-riding behavior). If, on contrary, sanctions are largely nonstrategic, we should learn
more about the primitive mechanisms sustaining the peer sanctioning system (e.g. the
role of emotions, relation to pro-social preferences).
In our paper, we therefore revisit a standard repeated public goods game with sanc-
tioning in order to study whether the observed sanctioning can be related to the strategic
management of the beliefs of other players, or whether it is nonstrategic and insensi-
tive to possible long-run benets associated with the initial investment into sanctioning.
We disentangle the strategically and non-strategically motivated sanctions by setting-up
an experiment with two treatments. Sanctioning is available in both of them, and in the
STANDARD treatment, the sanctions assigned to a subject are revealed to her in the same
round in which they were assigned. Contrary to that, in our main SECRET sanctions
treatment, a subject is informed on the sanctions received in each round of interaction
only at the end of the experiment. We argue that in this treatment, all strategic moti-
vations for sanctioning are removed. Any remaining sanctioning is due to nonstrategic
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motivations, and not a result of a short-run cost vs. long run benet payo¤-maximization
strategy. We compare the behavior in the two treatments in order to assess the relevance
of strategic sanctioning in repeated public goods games.
A similar quest for disentangling strategic and nonstrategic (emotional) motivations of
sanctioning can be found in the earlier work by Abbink et al. (2004)2, and by Casari and
Luini (2006). In both of these papers, actions of the subjects are restricted: Abbink et al.
(2004) restrict the options to cooperate by using mini-ultimatum game, and additionally,
the ultimatum game structure limits the sanctioning opportunities as well; Casari and
Luini (2006) use public goods game with more complex sequential sanctioning stage in
order to isolate the strategic motives. Moreover, the conclusions drawn in these two
papers are contradictory. Abbink et al. nd evidence in favor of strategic sanctioning,
while Casari and Luini conclude that sanctions are mostly nonstrategic. In view of this
scarce and contradictory evidence, the role the strategic sanctioning plays in a repeated
public goods game is unclear.
The experiment reported here has the advantage of studying a standard public goods
game, without restricting subjectsaction choices to binary strategy sets (possibly avoid-
ing randomization or opening a role for subjectsrisk preferences), or by increasing the
complexity of the sanctioning stage. We keep the sanctioning options constant across
both treatments of the standard linear public goods game, and the only aspect that dif-
fers across the two treatments is whether a sanction (if any) can have an immediate
impact on the behavior. Subjects can choose any level of cooperation, restricted by their
endowments and integer contributions only, allowing in this way for small changes in the
cooperation levels. In this way, we hope to shed more light on the relevance of strategic
and nonstrategic motives of sanctioning in repeated interactions, as well as on the dy-
namics of cooperation under the threat of being sanctioned, whether this threat has an
imminent or a delayed form.
Our ndings support nonstrategic explanation of sanctioning in the repeated public
goods game. We nd that sanctioning takes place in both treatments, and similar lev-
2Abbink et al. (2004) also used design comparing treatments where feedback on a co-players action
in a two-player game is either observed in each round, or at the end of the experiment only.
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els of freeriding in the public goods game are punished in a similar extent, whether the
sanctions are or are not immediately announced to the sanctioned individuals. This lack
of di¤erence between sanctioning in the two treatments leads us to the conclusion that
the sanctioning is prevailingly nonstrategic. Interestingly, we also observe that any form
of sanctioning increases contributions to the public good, although unsurprisingly to a
larger extent in the treatment where sanctions are immediately observed. We interpret
the survival of cooperation in the treatment with possible - but not immediately observed
sanctions - as an evidence for subjects expectations of nonstrategic sanctioning, sug-
gesting that sanctions do not have to hurt immediately in order to work. Observation
that subjects expect to be sanctioned for freeriding, although they receive no immediate
evidence, illustrates the crucial role of beliefs in altruistic punishment and speaks for sus-
taining of cooperation in societies where individuals do not necessarily interact in small
groups, under constant scrutiny, but rather interact sporadically, with the information on
their (uncooperative) behavior having long term consequences, overreaching those of the
immediately experienced (social) sanctions.
The setup of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the game and the
experiment design. The data are analyzed in section 3, and section 4 concludes.
2 The game and experimental design
2.1 The game
We implement a standard, nitely repeated linear public goods game with N  2 players
and with the possibility to sanction. In the stage game, all players rst simultaneously
choose their private contribution to the public goods game. The payo¤of player i = 1; ::; N
in one round of the public goods game prior to sanctioning is given by:
i = E   xi + (xi +X i) (1)
where xi 2 f0; 1; :::; Eg is the contribution to the public good by player i with i = 1; ::; N;
and X i is the sum of contributions of all players other than i; we denote by E > 0 the
initial symmetric endowment of each player, and  is the marginal return from the public
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good, with 1
N
<  < 1.
After the decisions on the contributions to the public goods game, sanctioning can take
place. Each player observes the contribution vector fx1; :::; xNg; receives an additional
endowment S > 0; and has to choose what amount of (integer) points from the endowment
S to assign to any of the other players. Let us denote by sij the amount of points player i
assigns to player j; j 6= i where sij 2 f0; 1; :::; Sg and
P
j 6=i sij  S: Player i0s payo¤ from
sanctioning in one round is given by:
fi = S  
X
j 6=i
sij   3
X
j 6=i
sji (2)
Every point that player i assigns to player j implies a "sanction" of 3 points deducted
from the payo¤ of the receiving player j at a cost of 1 point to the sanctioning player i.
Player is payo¤ in the stage game with sanctioning is given by
i = i + fi: (3)
In order to derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prediction for the stage game
with sanctioning played among rational, money-maximizing players with common knowl-
edge of the game and the playerspreferences for payo¤ maximization, we rst note that
sanctions are costly to the sender while yielding no direct material benet to her. Hence,
each player i = 1; ::; N will set sij = 0 to all j 6= i: No sanctions will be given and the
predicted contributions in stage 1 are equal to the contributions in a public goods game
without the sanctioning possibility. In order to derive those, we note that the private
cost of one unit contribution to the public good, which is equal to 1, exceeds the private
benet of the contribution, which is equal to , with 1
N
<  < 1. Consequently, the only
rational solution is to set xi = 0 for i = 1; :::; N . This solution is ine¢ cient, though, as
the maximal (and also joint-payo¤ maximizing) payo¤ is obtained if each group member
chooses contribution x = E.
Finally, if the stage game is repeated nitely many rounds, the backwards induction
leads to the prediction that no sanctions will be given in any round, and contributions to
the public good will be equal to 0 in all rounds.
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The assumption of pure money-maximization may be too restrictive, though, and the
public goods game with sanctioning might be also played by players with preferences
di¤ering from own-payo¤ maximization, in particular with preferences for altruistic pun-
ishment. These altruistic punishers do not choose sij = 0 for all j 6= i independent
of the contribution vector fx1; :::; xNg: conditional on the observed contribution vector
fx1; :::; xNg; altruistic punishers are willing to bear the costs of sanctioning to the extent
that these costs are compensated by the joy of the act or of the impact of their sanc-
tioning, in whatever way it might be (e.g. by decreasing payo¤ inequalities, reciprocating
to uncooperative behavior, seeking to express fairness norms etc.) We will refer to the
sanctioning performed by the altruistic punishers as nonstrategic sanctioning.3
Additionally to this type of sanctioning, we argue, strategic sanctioning might take
place in repeated interactions when playerspreferences are private information. Strategic
sanctioning comprises choices of rational money-maximizing players to assign the individu-
ally costly sanctions to freeriders in a repeated game because of the impact these sanctions
are expected to have on the behavior and the beliefs of the players in the future interac-
tions of the game. This mechanism of providing punishment (i.e. secondary public good)
by rational money-maximizers is akin to rational cooperation in a repeated public goods
game (Kreps et al. 1982). Sanctions will be provided by rational money-maximizers
if the investment into generating the belief that altruistic punishers are present in the
population would yield long-run benet outweighing the short-run costs of sanctioning.
Note that both nonstrategic and strategic motivations of sanctioning will be present
in a game where sanctions received in one round of the game can be related to the
contribution made in that round, and when players actually receive information on the
sanctions received by players in that round. Let us refer to this setup as STANDARD
sanctions repeated public goods game. Contrary to this, when sanctioning is possible
but players do not learn whether and who received sanctions during the play of the
game, then players are not able to adjust their beliefs about the presence of altruistic
3Note that we do not wish to investigate the specic form of preferences leading to altruistic punish-
ment, but rather to establish whether (a part of) the observed sanctioning does have an origin di¤erent
from the altruistic punishment. Our design allows us to do so without assuming specic form of the
altruistic punisherspreferences.
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punishers in the population, and/or change their freeriding behavior towards cooperation
in order to avoid future sanctioning. Consequently, there are no strategic motivations for
sanctioning in this case, where subjects would assign sanctions in order to change the
beliefs of others. Let us refer to this setup as SECRET sanctions repeated public goods
game. The only di¤erence in the STANDARD and SECRET sanctions public goods game
is the information on sanctions sent/received, which is postponed till the end of the game
in the SECRET sanctions case, but which is available after each round of interaction in
the STANDARD sanctions public goods game.
Until now, the prevailing explanation of sanctioning in the literature is that of non-
strategic motivations. We therefore state our null hypothesis as follows:
Null hypothesis (H0): Some subjects hold preferences for altruistic punishment. The
sanctioning observed in repeated public goods games is due to the rational, more-
than-payo¤maximizing choices of these subjects. Consequently, the extent of sanc-
tioning observed in the STANDARD and SECRET sanctions repeated public goods
game will be the same.
As discussed above, strategic reasons for sanctioning cannot be excluded based on the
evidence we have, hence, we state our alternative hypothesis:
Alternative hypothesis (HA): Rational, payo¤-maximizing subjects are also willing
to sanction freeriders in a repeated public goods game in order to manipulate the
beliefs of others with respect to the presence of altruistic punishers in the interac-
tion. Consequently, more sanctioning will be observed in the STANDARD sanctions
repeated public goods game, where this is possible, than in the SECRET sanctions
repeated public goods game, where no strategic motivations for sanctioning are
present.
2.2 Experiment design
In the fall semester of 2006, we ran four experimental sessions at Tilburg University,
the Netherlands. In total, 64 subjects participated in two treatments.4 Each subject
4We run our experimental sessions on two days. Besides the regression analysis reported below, we
also run regressions controlling for "day" e¤ects by including day-dummy variable. All our results were
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participated in only one treatment. The participants were students in economics, law, or
business. The language of the experiment was English. Upon arrival, participants were
randomly assigned to a computer terminal. They were informed that the experiment
consists of two tasks, and instructions for each task (see Appendix) were read aloud just
before the relevant task started. The experiment was fully computerized; the software
was programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 1999).
Each treatment consisted of two tasks. In Task 1, subjects were matched into groups
of four (N=4) and participated in 10 rounds of the repeated public goods game without
any sanctioning, with payo¤ function given by Equation (1), using  = 0:4 and E = 10:
They were informed that they would stay in the same group for all 10 rounds, but in
each round, subjects would be assigned a new label (ranging from 1 to 4). In this way,
subjects shared knowledge about the behavior of others in the group across rounds, but
they could not identify individual group members across rounds. In each round, each
subject received 10 tokens, and was asked to divide it between option I (public good) and
option II (private good). All formulations were in a neutral language. After each round,
each subject observed the contributions of all other subjects in his/her group.
At the beginning of Task 2, we regrouped all subjects into new groups, and we informed
them that they will stay in the same group again for all 10 rounds of Task 2. Also, subjects
labels changed again in each round, as it was in Task 1. In the second task, each round had
two stages. In stage 1, subjects chose their contributions to the public good. Then they
observed individual contributions, and received 10 tokens of stage 2 endowment (S=10).
In stage 2, subjects were able to assign any of their stage 2 endowment to any of the other
subjects in their group, and their payo¤ function was given by Equation (3).
The only thing that di¤ered in the two treatments we implemented is the information
feedback subjects received after assigning sanctions in Task 2. In the STANDARD sanc-
tions treatment, subjects were informed on the number of sanctioning points they received
in the same round in which these points were sent to them. In the SECRET sanctions
treatment, subjects did not learn anything about the sanctioning points received up till
the end of the experiment. Only after all 10 rounds of Task 2 were nished, each subject
robust to the inclusion of this dummy.
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learned how many points he/she received in each round.
Let us comment on the type of partner design that we used, and in which the subjects
remain in the same group, but their labels are re-assigned randomly after each round. In
this way, the same group interacts repeatedly, but under the condition that a link among
actions taken in di¤erent rounds is severed, i.e. by preserving anonymity across rounds.
Hence, this design combines two advantageous features useful in our experiment: (i) the
observations of sanctioning in various rounds are independent of contributions observed
in the previous rounds as the identity of the sanctioned/sanctioning individual cannot
be traced across rounds, (ii) subjects remain in the same group so that actions of some
subject observed in one round will a¤ect payo¤s of other subjects in the group in another
round as well. In this way, sanctioning can be "strategic" in relation to the contributions
to the public good, so that a sanction assigned in one round might a¤ect (if at all) both
the behavior in the public goods game as well as the beliefs about future sanctioning in
the following rounds.
The experiment lasted about 1.5 hours, and participants earned on average 10,70 Euro
(including 3 Euro participation fee).
3 Data analysis
In this section, we rst analyze the sanctioning in the two treatments in order to address
the role of strategic and nonstrategic sanctioning in the repeated public goods game.
Then, we proceed to analyze the impact the sanctioning (if any) has on the behavior in
the public goods game.
Let us rst turn attention to our main question: is the sanctioning observed in a
repeated public goods game largely nonstrategic, or do strategic motives play a signicant
role as well? Figure 1 summarizes the number of sanctioning points an individual sent
on average to another subject, while controlling for the di¤erence in the contributions of
the sender and the receiver.5 There is no striking di¤erence between the two treatments,
5Note that we refer here only to Task 2 of the experiment, where sanctioning took place, i.e. rounds
11 till 20. No sanctioning took place in rounds 1 till 10, referred to as Task 1. If not mentioned explicitly,
any analysis of the sanctioning behavior in this section is naturally restricted to the analysis of Task 2 of
the relevant treatment.
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Figure 1: Average Sanction Points Sent: Controlling for the Di¤erence Between the
Senders and the Receivers Contributions.
and this is supported by a non-parametric test, according to which subjects in the two
treatments send on average the same amount of sanctions for the same di¤erence between
the senders and receivers contribution (Wilcoxon paired test, p=0.768). The fact that
we observe sanctions in the SECRET sanctions treatment is an evidence towards the
presence of nonstrategic motives, as is the similarity in the pattern of sanctioning in the
two treatments.6
Before proceeding to a regression analysis, making this point more precise, let us also
note (see Figure 2) that the dynamics of sanctioning over time supports the nonstrategic
nature of sanctions as well. In the SECRET sanctions treatment, where behavior in the
public goods game does not change over time dramatically (see also panels (b) and (d) in
Figure 4 below), the sanctions remain at the same level over all rounds of interaction. At
the same time, sanctions in the STANDARD treatment lead to an increase in contributions
to the public good with a concomitant decrease in sanctions over time - however, the
sanctioning returns back in the last period of interaction. Inconsistent with strategic
explantations for sanctioning, subjects do assign sanctions in the last period, when the
6The similarity is also preserved when we split the dataset into the rst half of Task 2 (rounds 11 to
15) and the second half (rounds 16 to 20).
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Figure 2: Average Sanction Points Sent per Period.
cooperation in the public goods game deteriorates, although they cannot expect any long
run benets from these end-game sanctions.
While the dynamics of the sanctioning suggests nonstrategic motives (see Figure 2),
our conclusions cannot be made without relating the sanctioning to the behavior in the
public goods game. In order to control for variables which might a¤ect the choice to
punish, we run logit regression explaining the decision of player i to sanction another
player j. Our dependent variable is sanctionij where sanctionij = 1 if sij > 0, and
sanctionij = 0 if sij = 0. We explain is decision to sanction j by the di¤erence between
the public goods contributions by i and j, xi and xj. The two variables we include are
posxi_xj which equals xi   xj if xi > xj and 0 else; and negxi_xj which equals xi   xj
if xi < xj and 0 else. In this way, we allow for asymmetric e¤ect of cases when player j
is relative freerider compared to player i; and vice versa, when player j is relatively more
cooperative than player i:We also use treatment dummy variable secret which equals 1 in
the SECRET sanctions treatment and equals 0 in the STANDARD sanctions treatment.
We interact the variables posxi_xj and negxi_xj with the dummy secret to determine
whether the pattern of sanctioning di¤ers across the treatments. Individual and period
dummies are included. The period dummies are also interacted with secret to control
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Variable Coef. Std. Err. P>jzj
secret 0.335 0.519 0.519
negxi_xj -0.053 0.047 0.266
negxi_xjsecret -0.045 0.067 0.491
posxi_xj 0.418** 0.050 0.000
posxi_xjsecret 0.325** 0.089 0.000
_cons 0.823 0.584 0.159
Individual dummies included
Period dummies included
Period dummies interacted with dummy secret included
N=1590 (11 subjects dropped due to sanctionij=0 for each j 6=i in all 10 rounds)
Log likelihood = -570.609
Pseudo R2 = 0.4023
Table 1: Logit Regression: Explaining is Decision to Sanction or Not Sanction j.
for possible di¤erences in the dynamics of sanctioning in the STANDARD and SECRET
sanctions treatments.
The regression results can be found in Table 1. Based on them, we can conclude that
the probability of assigning a sanction is signicantly higher when the receiver contributes
less than the sender: freeriders are being punished (coe¢ cient on posxi_xj is positive
and signicant). Moreover, this e¤ect is stronger in the SECRET sanctions treatment
(coe¢ cient on posxi_xjsecret is positive and signicant). The session dummy secret is
not signicant.
In view of these results, we state:
Observation 1: Sanctions are prevailingly nonstrategic. Controlling for the di¤erences
in the senders and receivers contributions to the public good, we nd that subjects
sanction freeriders, and they are more likely to do so in the SECRET sanctions
treatment than in the STANDARD treatment.
Hence, rather than nding more sanctioning in the STANDARD treatment (due to the
strategic motivations), we nd sanctioning is more likely to be triggered in the SECRET
sanctions treatment. We suggest that this result might be related to the role emotions
play in the sanctioning. In the SECRET sanctions treatment, no feedback is given about
the sanctions received. Consequently, subjects are not exposed to the enforcement via
receiving sanctions, that would motivate them to adjust their behavior in the public
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goods game. Consequently, the frustration of the cooperators vis-a-vis the freeriders is
possibly stirred repeatedly in the SECRET sanctions treatment, resulting in emotions-
driven motivations to sanction when the same freeriding behavior is observed over and
over. This explanation, of course, is open to further research.
Now, having answered our main question - and nding that sanctions are mainly
nonstrategic - we now continue to investigate one equally interesting point, namely the
impact of sanctioning on the contributions to the public good in our two treatments.
They di¤er in the subjectsability to respond to the sanctions received. In the SECRET
sanctions treatment, subjects do not observe the sanctioning - if any - and hence cannot
react to it. Sanctions cannot have any direct enforcing impact on the behavior. Does that
mean that sanctions represent a pure social loss in the SECRET sanctions treatment?
The answer is no. Sanctions, although not observed in the SECRET sanctions treat-
ment, do have an impact on the behavior in the public goods game! Let us now support
this answer by two sets of results. First, we present nonparametric tests on the groups
average contributions to the public good, and then the results of a regression analysis on
the adjustment of the subjects contribution to the public good over time.
The average contributions to the public good in the STANDARD and SECRET sanc-
tions treatment are summarized in Figure 3, but more illustrative Figure 4 is presented
as well. This gure maps the dynamics of contributions in both treatments in all groups
over time, both in rounds 1-10 (in Task 1, without the possibility to sanction) and in
rounds 11-20 (in Task 2, with the possibility to sanction).
At a rst glance on Figure 3, it is clear that the possibility to assign sanctions, whether
announced immediately after being assigned or not, does improve cooperation in the
public goods game as compared to the rounds without sanctioning. This is marginally
conrmed by the MWU test at a group level, when using all 16 groups and comparing their
average contributions in rounds 1-10 (Task 1 without sanctions) to those in rounds 11-20
(Task 2 with possible sanctions) (MWU, N=32, p=0.094). This impact on contributions
is signicant in STANDARD sanctions treatment (MWU, N=14, p=0.026), but not in
SECRET sanctions treatment (MWU, N=18, p=0.730). However, there is no signicant
di¤erence in the average contributions in Task 2 in the two treatments (rounds 11-20 with
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Figure 4: Contributions to the Public Good per Treatment, Group and Period.
15
possible sanctions) (MWU, N=16, p=0.210). This can be explained by the bifurcation of
the group behavior in Task 2 in the STANDARD sanctions treatment where some groups
increase and some decrease their contributions over time, while contributions do not
change dramatically from the rst till the last period in Task 2 in the SECRET sanctions
treatment (compare panels (c) and (d) in Figure 4, respectively). In other words, the
di¤erences among groups are larger in Task 2 with STANDARD sanctions, but SECRET
sanctions lead, on average, to the same e¢ ciency gain as when the sanctions are announced
and can immediately enforce cooperation.7
Observation 2: Both SECRET and STANDARD sanctions increase contributions to
the public good.
In order to understand better this puzzling and rather spectacular nding, we use
regression analysis and control for variables confounding the explanations of our observa-
tion. We run a multinomial logit regression explaining the change of own contribution to
the public good between periods t 1 and t using data from Task 2 of our two treatments.
There are two payo¤-relevant pieces of information a subject could take into account when
adjusting own contributions to the public good over time. First, and in the STANDARD
treatment only, the sanctions received in the previous period could deter freeriding. We
have shown before that sanctions are related to the contributions the sanction receiver
made in the previous period as compared to the sender, and that freeriders are those who
receive sanctions. If sanctions do have a deterrence impact, and the sanction receivers
are motivated to avoid them in the future, then receiving sanctions makes it more likely
7The dynamics of contributions in Task 2 of the STANDARD and in the SECRET sanctions treatment
seems to di¤er from that of the dynamics in Task 1 (the public goods game without the sanctioning),
see Figure 4. Focusing on group level data, we nd that in Task 1 (without sanctioning), 6 out of 16
groups show signicant (at 5% level) negative Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cient between the groups
contribution and the period, while the correlation is insignicant in the remaining groups mainly due to
the fact that subjects contribute close to 0 from the start (no decline is possible).
While the correlation is either negative or missing in Task 1, we nd more variance in the behavior
of groups in Task 2 of the SECRET and STANDARD sanctions treatments. We nd both groups that
show positive or negative signicant correlations between groups contributions and the time period; as
well as insignicant correlations at an initial level of contribution that is above 0.
This variety of the group-based correlation coe¢ cients further corroborate our ndings from the re-
gression analysis reported below, namely that the public goods game played in the absence of sanctioning
(Task 1) is di¤erent both from that played in the presence of SECRET or of STANDARD sanctions (Task
2).
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to increase own contribution, and less likely to decrease own contribution in the following
period. Second, and in both treatments, subjects motivated by sanction avoidance would
respond to their relative position in the group. Contributing less than others, on average,
in the group implies that the subject is freeriding on at least one other group member.
If subjects expect to be sanctioned for freeriding and want to avoid sanctions, then con-
tributing less than others on average gives an incentive to increase own contribution. Note
that if nonstrategic sanctioning is expected, the relative position in the group is relevant
for the formation of expectations of sanctioning in both treatments. Hence, by observing
the impact of own contribution relative to the group average in the SECRET sanctions
treatment and the STANDARD sanctions treatment, we can measure whether subjects
believe that others engage in nonstrategic sanctioning.
In the regressions, our dependent variable; xit; is dened by xit =  1 if the subject
decreases own contribution (xi;t  xi;t 1<0), xit = 1 if the subject increases own contri-
bution (xi;t   xi;t 1>0), and xit = 0 otherwise. As independent variables, we include:
(1) variable finerec which equals to the number of punishment points sent by the others
to player i in period t   1 in the STANDARD treatment (Pj 6=i sji), and equals 0 in the
SECRET sanctions treatment, and (2) variables posxi_xavg and negxi_xavg measuring
whether player i in the previous period t 1 contributed more or less than the other players
on average, respectively; posxi_xavg = 1 if xi;t 1  1N
P
j xj;t 1 > 0 and posxi_xavg = 0
otherwise; and negxi_xavg = 1 if xi;t 1  1N
P
j xj;t 1 < 0 and negxi_xavg = 0 otherwise.
We interact both of these variables with the treatment dummy secret, where secret = 1
in the SECRET sanctions treatment, and equals 0 otherwise. Our results can be found
in Table 2.
With respect to the overt enforcement, we nd that receiving a sanction makes it
less likely to decrease own contribution (finerec negative and signicant in explaining
xi =  1); i.e. sanctions prevent erosion of cooperation. We do not nd the e¤ect that
sanctions directly stimulate cooperation in our data.
More interesting, though, is that we do nd evidence for the role of expected sanction-
ing: a subject who contributed less than the group average was more likely to increase
own contribution as a response (the coe¢ cient negxi_xavg is positive and signicant
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xi =  1 xi = 1
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P>jzj Coef. Std. Err. P>jzj
secret -1.618 1.460 0.268 -1.278 1.637 0.435
posxi_xavg 0.327 0.961 0.734 -3.328** 1.181 0.005
posxi_xavgsecret 6.842** 2.025 0.001 0.781 1.670 0.640
negxi_xavg -0.593 1.472 0.687 4.187** 1.570 0.008
negxi_xavgsecret 1.800 1.981 0.364 -3.391* 1.821 0.062
finerec -0.275** 0.100 0.006 0.097 0.089 0.272
_cons -5.052* 2.604 0.052 -0.371 1.930 0.848
Individual dummies included
Period dummies included
Period dummies interacted with secret included
N=576
Log likelihood = -164.908
Pseudo R2 = 0.7393
Table 2: Multinomial Logit Regression: Explaining is Change in Contribution to the
Public Good in Games With Sanctioning.
in explaining xi = 1). Although this e¤ect is less pronounced in the SECRET sanc-
tions treatment (the coe¢ cient negxi_xavgsecret is negative and signicant in explaining
xi = 1) it is still present even when sanctions are not announced to their receivers (the
relevant sum of the coe¢ cients negxi_xavg + negxi_xavgsecret is positive and signi-
cant in explaining xi = 1). Consequently, subjects who observe that they contributed
less than others do increase their contribution, and this even in the SECRET sanctions
treatment. Without observing sanctions (if any) for being a freerider, subjects adjust
their behavior towards higher contributions, because - we argue - they expect that they
are being sanctioned by altruistic punishers.8 Let us also remark that our main ndings
are stable with respect to variations of the model, in which we selectively include/exclude
the individual and period dummies. In particular, in all these variations, the coe¢ cient
negxi_xavg + negxi_xavgsecret is positive and signicant in explaining xi = 1: Sub-
jects contributing less than others on average in the group do increase their contributions
in the SECRET sanctions treatment.
8Let us also note that subjects also avoid being the sucker in their group. When contributing more
than the group average, subjects are more likely to decrease own contribution in the SECRET sanctions
treatment (coe¢ cient posxi_xavgsecret is negative and signicant in explaining xi =  1); and less
likely to increase own contribution in both treatments (coe¢ cient posxi_xavg is negative and signicant
in explaining xi = +1)
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xi =  1 xi = 1
Variable Coef. Std. Err. P>jzj Coef. Std. Err. P>jzj
secret 2.144 2.961 0.469 -1.164 2.043 0.569
posxi_xavg 6.350** 1.493 0.000 0.475 0.889 0.593
posxi_xavgsecret 0.330 2.247 0.883 -2.965** 1.486 0.046
negxi_xavg 0.765 1.302 0.557 0.752 1.193 0.529
negxi_xavgsecret -1.079 1.879 0.566 0.929 1.076 0.388
_cons -4.492** 1.978 0.023 1.382 1.429 0.333
Individual dummies included
Period dummies included
Period dummies interacted with secret included
N=648
Log likelihood = -230.28096
Pseudo R2 = 0.6618
Table 3: Multinomial Logit Regression: Explaining is Change in Contribution to the
Public Good in games Without Sanctions Observed.
Before concluding that this behavior is due to the expected nonstrategic sanctioning
(i.e. sanctioning which might be taking place but is kept unannounced for the moment),
we have to control for the possibility that a subject who contributed less than the group
average in the previous round might increase own contribution in the current round due
to positive reciprocity. In order to isolate such positive reciprocity motives from the
motives of avoiding expected nonstrategic sanctioning, we run one more regression in
which we explain the adjustment of contributions in Task 1 and in Task 2 of the SECRET
sanctions treatment. In both tasks, subjects choose public good contributions and observe
no sanctions, but in Task 2, sanctioning might be taking place. Hence, the comparison
of the contribution adjustments in the two tasks allows us to identify the role of to the
secret sanctions; i.e. the role of the expectations of nonstrategic sanctioning.
We run multinomial regression similar to that in Table 2 using the same explanatory
variables as before, while dropping the irrelevant variable finerec (subjects observe no
sanctioning in the two games we compare). The results of the analysis can be found in
Table 3.
Recall that we run this regression in order to avoid confusing an increase in own
contributions motivated by the avoidance of expected altruistic punishment (possible only
in Task 2) with motivations of positive reciprocity (possible both in Task 2 as well as in
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Task 1). We nd that positive reciprocity plays no role in neither of the two tasks:
(coe¢ cients on negxi_xavg and negxi_xavgsecret are both insignicant in explaining
xi = 1). Having controlled for the alternative explanation of positive reciprocity, we
now can state:
Observation 3: Subjects expect that nonstrategic sanctioning takes place. Consequently,
when sanctioning is possible, players are more likely to increase own contributions
when their contributions are below the group average, even if they currently cannot
observe whether sanctions are actually being used or not.
4 Conclusions
Cooperation in public goods games can be sustained by peer sanctioning if some individ-
uals hold preferences for altruistic punishment. For these individuals, the material costs
incurred in sanctioning are compensated by the act or the impact of the sanctioning itself.
We suggest that nonstrategic motivations cannot be fully separated from strategic mo-
tivations for sanctioning that arise in repeated games. Under incomplete information on
the individual preferences, (some) players might nd it protable to mimic the behavior
of altruistic punishers and assign sanctions strategically to freeriders in order to stimulate
the beliefs that altruistic punishers are present in the population. In repeated interac-
tions, the costs of sanctioning incurred in the short run might be more than compensated
by the gains from cooperation in the long run.
Assessing the role of strategic sanctioning is important as the two forms of sanctioning
in repeated interactions - nonstrategic and strategic - could result in di¤erent advice on the
design of institutions which rely on the peer sanctioning system. For example, strategic
motives of sanctioning would result in advice to design institutions that promote strategic
motives, e.g. constrain the interactions to small groups, with a rich feedback on behavior
of the group members. As such designs might be costly, or restrictive, the relevance of the
strategic enforcement of cooperation by imitating altruistic punishment is of more than
of academic interest.
In this paper, we therefore designed a simple experiment of a repeated public goods
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game with sanctioning with two treatments. The incentives for nonstrategic sanctioning
were present in both of the treatments, but the strategic incentives were present only
in one of them. In the control treatment, we replicated a STANDARD sanctions public
goods game, where after each round, subjects can assign sanctions, and immediately
learn whether they received sanctions. In our main treatment, the SECRET sanctions
public goods game, the possibility to assign sanctions was unchanged, but the information
on received sanctions is obtained only at the end of the experiment. Consequently, all
strategic motivations to assign sanctions are removed in this treatment. By comparing
the extent and patterns of sanctioning in the two treatments, we can assess the relevance
of strategic sanctioning in the repeated public goods games.
We nd that the extent and patterns of sanctioning are the same in both treat-
ments, giving support for prevailingly nonstrategic origins of sanctioning. Additionally,
our equally interesting nding is the observation that not only sanctions that subjects
could immediately observe, but also sanctions which remained unannounced up till the
end of the experiment, did have an impact on contributions to the public goods game in
the direction of increasing e¢ ciency. The impact that even unobserved sanctions have
on contributions to the public good might be surprising at rst, but can be explained by
the role of expectations. We nd that subjects in the STANDARD sanctions treatment
increase their contributions to the public good after they observed to have contributed
less than others. This e¤ect is also present - although to a smaller extent - in the SE-
CRET sanctions treatment. We interpret this as an evidence for the role of expectations
of nonstrategic sanctioning. Subjects try to avoid nonstrategic sanctions - which they
expect although do not observe - and this disciplines their cooperative behavior in the
public goods game.
To summarize, we do not nd signicant e¤ect of strategic motivations for sanctioning
in the repeated public goods game in our experiment. Sanctions are prevailingly non-
strategic, and subjects also expect that nonstrategic sanctioning takes place. Hence, even
sanctions which are not immediately observed do have a deterrence impact on freeriding
and can enforce cooperation to some extent. Based on this evidence, we believe that the
line of research focusing on the mechanism of nonstrategic sanctioning (role of emotions
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and origins of emotions, neuroeconomic studies) is central to our understanding of the
peer sanctioning mechanism, and its institutionalized application in mechanisms relying
on it. The evidence on the expectation of nonstrategic sanctioning, and the related im-
pact of unobserved sanctions on the cooperation, opens a range of fascinating questions
on sustaining cooperation by altruistic punishment.
5 APPENDIX - EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
Introduction
You will now participate in an experiment on economic decisionmaking (the project EDM1). The
experiment will last approximately 1.5 hours. You will be paid 5 Euro participation fee immediately after
the experiment. Any additional earnings you will make in the experiment will be paid to you next week
(and after the participation in the project EDM2). How much you earn today crucially depends on your
and othersdecisions in todays experiment. Note that whatever you do in this experiment will not have
any e¤ect on the project EDM2. The two projects are independent, and have no connection between
each other.9
During the whole experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other participants. Disobeying this rule
will result in your exclusion from the experiment. In this experiment, you will participate in two tasks.
You will earn points in each of them and these points translate into real money that will be paid to you
next week.
The exchange rate is: 1 points = 3 Cents; 100 points = 3 Euros.
The experiments consists of two independent Tasks. We rst read instructions for Task 1, then you
participate in Task 1, and then the same takes place for Task 2. Your earning for Task 1 is independent
from earning for Task 2.
Task 1
This task has 10 rounds. In each round, you will be in a group with three other participants; a group
therefore consists of four participants in total. Note that you will be matched in the same group in each
round of Task 1, but each individual will receive a di¤erent identity name, ID 1, 2, 3 or 4 in each round.
9The project EDM2 used eye-tracking machines to measure decision processes in matrix games. As
announced to the students, the current project was fully payo¤-independent from this other project
EDM2, and we used separate recruitment into sessions to give a credible signal of this independence.
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The sum of tokens of the other three subjects in the group(Y)
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
0 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16 17.2 18.4 19.6 20.8 22
1 9.4 10.6 11.8 13 14.2 15.4 16.6 17.8 19 20.2 21.4
2 8.8 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16 17.2 18.4 19.6 20.8
3 8.2 9.4 10.6 11.8 13 14.2 15.4 16.6 17.8 19 20.2
4 7.6 8.8 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16 17.2 18.4 19.6
5 7 8.2 9.4 10.6 11.8 13 14.2 15.4 16.6 17.8 19
6 6.4 7.6 8.8 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16 17.2 18.4
7 5.8 7 8.2 9.4 10.6 11.8 13 14.2 15.4 16.6 17.8
8 5.2 6.4 7.6 8.8 10 11.2 12.4 13.6 14.8 16 17.2
9 4.6 5.8 7 8.2 9.4 10.6 11.8 13 14.2 15.4 16.6T
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Figure 5: Payo¤ Table.
For example, participant labelled ID 1 in one round is not the same individual as participant labelled ID
1 in another round.
Earnings
In every round, you will receive 10 tokens. You decide on how many of these tokens to use for a joint
project. If you choose to put x tokens in the joint project and the sum of tokens chosen by the other
three subjects in your group equals Y, your payo¤ for this round will be: Payo¤ = 10 x + 0.4*(x + Y)
This means that choosing x tokens for the joint project decreases your payo¤ by x, and increases your
payo¤ by 0.4 times x. At the same time, it increases the payo¤ of everyone else by 0.4 times x. When
making your decisions, you can use the above formula, but you can also make use of the Payo¤ Table
below. This Table contains the number of points you can earn for di¤erent combinations of the number
of tokens xyou can choose for the joint project and the sum of number of tokens Ythe other three
subjects choose for the joint project. Please, have a look at the Payo¤ Table now.
In the rst column (in grey), you nd all possible actions you may choose, that is the number of tokens
you put into the joint project 0,1, . . . 10. In the rst row (in grey), you nd (some) of the possible sums
of tokens chosen by the other three subjects. Your payo¤ in points can be found for each combination of
xand Yin the Payo¤ Table.
Example: Suppose you choose 4 tokens. In the grey column, nd the row that begins with 4. And,
suppose the other three subjects choose 12 tokens in total. In the grey row, nd the column that begins
with 12. Look in the Table for the intersection of the row starting with 4 and the column starting with
12. You nd that your earnings in points for that case would be 12.4 points.
Observe: the number of points you earn depends crucially on the choices of the other three subjects
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Figure 6: Screen 1.
in your group. If, for example, you choose 2 tokens for the joint project and if the sum of choices of other
group subjects is 0, you earn 8.8 points, however, if the sum of choices of the other group subjects is 15
then you earn 14.8 points. Also, the number of points earned by the others depends on your choices.
For example, if the other three subjects were all choosing 3 (which makes Y = 9) and you chose 0, their
payo¤ would be 10.6, where as if you chose 6, their payo¤ will be 13. Other group subjects a¤ect how
many points you earn, and you a¤ect how many points they earn.
We will now explain how the computer screens look like.
SCREEN 1 (see Figure 6)
This is the screen which tells you your ID for this round. The ID will range from 1 to 4. After
checking your ID, click on OK to proceed.
SCREEN 2 (see Figure 7)
Here you decide on how many tokens you will use for the joint project in this round. Use the keyboard
to type in one of the numbers 0, 1 . . . 10 and conrm your choice by pressing OK.
Warning: Before pressing OK, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot change your decision after
you have pressed OK. After having pressed OK, you will be asked to wait until all experiment participants
have done the same. The experiment continues only after all experiment participants pressed OK. We
therefore kindly ask you not to delay your decision too much. After pressing OK, a waiting screen will
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Figure 7: Screen 2.
appear. After all experiment participants have pressed OK, Screen 3 will appear.
SCREEN 3 (see Figure 8)
In the upper part of this screen you nd a table with information on the number of tokens chosen for
the joint project by each subject as well as the payo¤ that you earned. In the lower part, you nd the
same information for all group subjects. Click on OK if you are done with checking the information.
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions at this moment. The experiment now starts with
a short test to make sure that everybody understands how you earn your points. Use the formula or
the Payo¤ Table to answer the following questions. After all experiment participants answered all the
questions correctly, the experiment will begin.
Understanding Test (after Task 1)
1) If you use 3 tokens for the joint project and the other three subjects use 10 tokens each, what
is the number of points you earn? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
2) If you use 9 tokens for the joint project and the other three subjects use a total of 6 tokens,
what is the number of points you earn? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
3) Circle the correct answer:
1. You are given 10 tokens at the beginning of each round.
2. You are given 10 tokens only at the rst round, and in the rest of the rounds, you will
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Figure 8: Screen 3.
chose from the remainders of the tokens from the previous rounds.
3. You are given some number of tokens from 0 to 10 at random.
4) Circle the correct answer:
1. You will be in the same group with the same 3 subjects for every round in Task 1, and
their ID will be the same for every round. The ID 1 in the rst round will continue to be ID 1 for the
rest of the rounds.
2. You will be in the same group with the same 3 subjects for every round in Task 1, but the
ID will be di¤erent in every round. The person with ID 1 in the rst round will not always be ID1.
3. You will be matched to di¤erent 3 subjects in the beginning of every round. The ID will
also be di¤erent between the rounds.
Please raise your hand when you are nished with the understanding test. We will now start the
experiment with two UNPAID TRIAL rounds. Use these two rounds to learn how the computer program
works. After that, we will match you into groups and the experiment will start.
Task 2
Task 2 also has 10 rounds. You will be again randomly matched into a group of four. This group
will be a di¤erent group than in TASK 1. Again, you will stay in the same group for 10 rounds but your
ID will change in each round.
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In Task 2, every round consists of two stages. Stage 1 of every round is the same as Task 1. Also the
Payo¤ Table is the same as before. Let us explain Stage 2.
In the beginning of Stage 2 of a round (which immediately follows Stage 1 in each round), you will
receive 10 tokens, which are worth 10 points to you. You can spend any number of these 10 tokens to
reduce the points from the earnings of the other three subjects. Every token you spent will decrease the
earnings of the subject receiving it by 3 points. The sum of tokens you spend in Stage 2 must not exceed
10. Your earning in a round can be written in the following equation:
Payo¤ in Stage 1+(10 - number of TOKENS that you spent in Stage 2)  (3the sum of TOKENS
that the other three subjects spent on you in Stage 2).
Let us give one example. Say that in Stage 1 you earned 11.1 points. In Stage 2, say you spent 2
tokens on the other subject, and the sum of tokens the other 3 subjects spent on you were 1 tokens. Your
earning for this round will be: 11.1 + 10 - 2 - 3 * 1 = 16.1
[In STANDARD sanctions treatment: After everyone made their decision in Stage 2, you will learn
results of Stage 2 as well the total number of points you earned in this round.]
[In SECRET sanctions treatment: After everyone made their decision in Stage 2, you will receive the
summary of Stage 1 earnings. The only information you will receive on Stage 2 is your remainders of
the 10 tokens, which is 10 minus the number of tokens you spent. This is the amount of points you will
earn in Stage 2 if no other subjects spend any token on you. The other results of Stage 2 such as the
number of tokens spent on you by other three, as well the number of tokens that were spent and received
by others - and the total number of points you earned in each round will be given to you only after you
nish all 10 rounds. (We explain the summary screen below.)].
We will now explain how the computer screens look like. SCREENS 1 to 3 are very similar to the
screens discussed in Task 1.
SCREEN 4 (see Figure 9)
In the upper part of this screen you nd a table with information on the number of tokens chosen for
the joint project by each subject in Stage 1 of this round and the points each subjects earned in Stage
1. In the lower part of this screen, you are asked to make a decision on how many tokens from your 10
tokens you want to spend to decrease the earnings of each of the other three subjects. For each subject
in your group, you have to put in a number between 0 and 10; the sum of the number of tokens you
spend must not exceed 10 tokens. For yourself, you must put in 0. Press OK, when you are ready to
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Figure 9: Screen 4.
continue. A waiting screen will appear. The experiment continues only after all experiment participants
have pressed OK, and therefore we kindly ask you not to delay your decision too much.
SCREEN 5 (see Figure 10)
In this screen you will be provided with all the information about this round. You will learn about
the points you earned in each stage of the round and about the points each of the other subjects in your
group earned in Stage 1.
[In STANDARD sanctions treatment: You also learn the number of tokens each subject in your group,
including you, spent and received in this period in Stage 2.]
[In SECRET sanctions treatment: The other results of Stage 2 such as: the number of tokens the
other three subjects spent on you, or the number of tokens that the other subjects spent or received, or
the total number of points you earned in a round, will not be shown in each round. Only at the end
of the experiment, after all 10 rounds are nished, you will be able to nd these information about the
decisions made in Stage 2.]
SCREEN 6 (see Figure 11)
At the end of all 10 rounds you will obtain a summary information screen with both the information
on Stage 1 and Stage 2. In this screen, you will be able to observe all choices in Stage 1 and Stage 2
in each round. You will be able to see the number of tokens you spent to decrease the points of other
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(a) STANDARD treatment (b) SECRET treatment
Figure 10: Screen 5.
subjects as well as the number of tokens the other three subjects spent to decrease your earnings, and
the nal points for each round. You can also see this information for all of the subjects in your group,
for each round.
Please, raise your hand if you have questions at this moment. The experiment now starts with
a short test to make sure that everybody understands how the points are earned. Use your Table to
answer the following questions. After all experiment participants answered all questions correctly, the
experiment will begin.
Understanding Test (after Task 2)
1) If you spend 2 tokens on one of the subjects in Stage 2, what is the total number of points by
which you have decreased the payo¤ of that subject? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) If each of the other three subjects in the group spends 1 token on you in Stage 2, what is the total
number of points by which they decreased your earnings? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3) Say your earning from Stage 1 was 12.6. If you spend 2 tokens on one subject and none for the
others, and each of the other three subjects in the group spend 1 token on you (you received 3 tokens), what
is the number of points you will earn in this round? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Please raise your hand and have your answers checked by the experimenter. After everyone has
nished, we will start the experiment with two UNPAID TRIAL rounds. Use these two rounds to learn
how the computer program works. After that, we will match you into new groups and the experiment
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(a) STANDARD treatment (b) SECRET treatment
Figure 11: Screen 6.
will start.
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